Computational Model Library

Replication of ECEC model: Environmental Feedback and the Evolution of Cooperation

Pierre Bommel | Published Tue Apr 5 15:09:08 2011 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:45 2013

The model, presented here, is a re-implementation of the Pepper and Smuts’ model : - Pepper, J.W. and B.B. Smuts. 2000. “The evolution of cooperation in an ecological context: an agent-based model”. Pp. 45-76 in T.A. Kohler and G.J. Gumerman, eds. Dynamics of human and primate societies: agent-based modeling of social and spatial processes. Oxford University Press, Oxford. - Pepper, J.W. and B.B. Smuts. 2002. “Assortment through Environmental Feedback”. American Naturalist, 160: 205-213 […]

Vulnerability of Cooperation Due to Limited Vision

Marco Janssen | Published Thu Dec 2 23:00:56 2010 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:53 2013

This model describes the consequences of limited vision of agents in harvesting a common resource. We show the vulnerability of cooperation due to reduced visibility of the resource and other agents.

Peer reviewed Evolution of Cooperation in Asymmetric Commons Dilemmas

Marco Janssen Nathan Rollins | Published Fri Aug 20 18:41:16 2010 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013

This model can be used to explore under which conditions agents behave as observed in field experiments on irrigation games.

CPNorm

Ruth Meyer | Published Sun Jun 4 14:19:17 2017 | Last modified Tue Jun 13 12:25:12 2017

CPNorm is a model of a community of harvesters using a common pool resource where adhering to the optimal extraction level has become a social norm. The model can be used to explore the robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons.

The Groundwater Commons Game

Juan Carlos Castilla-Rho Rodrigo Rojas | Published Thu May 11 13:04:53 2017 | Last modified Sat Sep 16 03:46:39 2017

The Groundwater Commons Game synthesises and extends existing work on human cooperation and collective action, to elucidate possible determinants and pathways to regulatory compliance in groundwater systems globally.

Irrigation game

Marco Janssen | Published Mon Jul 23 04:15:12 2012 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:37 2013

Irrigation game calibrated on experimental data

cultural group and persistent parochialism

Jae-Woo Kim | Published Mon Nov 8 06:23:12 2010 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:28 2013

Discriminators who have limited tolerance for helping dissimilar others are necessary for the evolution of costly cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Existing research reports that trust in

A spatial prisoner’s dilemma model with mobile agents, de-coupled birth-death events, and harsh environments.

The model employs an agent-based model for exploring the victim-centered approach to identifying human trafficking and the approach’s effectiveness in an abstract representation of migrant flows.

Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Complex Networks with Agents' Adaptive Expectations

Bo Xianyu | Published Wed Nov 16 11:34:40 2011 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:43 2013

This model studies the effect of the agents’ adaptive expectation on cooperation frequency in the prisoner’s dilemma game in complex networks from an agent based approach. The model is implemented in Repast simphony 1.2.

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